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Abstract
I examine the effects of fiscal policy actions on private consumption in a yearly panel
of sixteen OECD countries conditional on the phase of the business cycle and the
state of the public finances. I demonstrate that binding liquidity constraints on
households can alter the efficacy of the policy changes in the four regimes—defined
by the conditioning states—with expansionary fiscal policy boosting consumption in
recessions, having a nil effect on it in normal times or in fiscal stress, and strongly
displacing consumption in mixed states when recession and fiscal stress coincide.
This happens because the liquidity constrained households consume the additional
income generated by an expansionary fiscal policy in recession, and save it in normal
times or in fiscal stress when liquidity constraints are not binding. If recession and
fiscal stress coincide, fiscal action have an extra distortionary effect on income, and
consequently on consumption. JEL: E62, E20, E32, H30
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1 Introduction
The effect of fiscal policy on private consumption is of central importance for the policy’s
macroeconomic efficacy.1 Yet, the current debate about fiscal policy since the beginning
of the Great Recession has made one thing clear: the empirical pre-crisis evidence on the
impact of fiscal policy on output covers a wide range of possible effects.2 In addition,
the response of consumption following fiscal shocks has been found to be both positive or
negative, but generally small. Key questions in the recent literature have been whether
fiscal policy is more effective in periods of slack, and whether weak fiscal health can reduce
this effectiveness.
The goal of this paper is to examine the effects of government spending and taxation
on household consumption controlling simultaneously for two sets of initial conditions—
the phase of the business cycle and the state of the public finances in a panel of sixteen
OECD countries for the period from 1974 to 2011. To this intent, I divide business cycles
into good and bad phases, or expansions and contractions, respectively, as has been done
in the literature after Burns and Mitchell (1946) and as the general public appreciates this
phenomenon. Similarly, I differentiate between good and bad health of the public finances.
The notion for doing this is the idea that economic agents recognise the existence of a
threshold for the accumulated actions of the government above which a stressful fiscal
event is increasingly likely. This type of categorization of fiscal vulnerabilities is also
widely spread in the economic analysis (see, e.g., Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogoff, 2012).
The aim to measure the conditional effects of fiscal policy simultaneously is twofold.
First, the fiscal policy’s transmission mechanism may change significantly in the four
possible states defined by the initial conditioning factors: normal state, recession, fiscal
stress, and mixed state—periods when recession and fiscal stress coincide. For example,
in periods of fiscal stress the economy’s response to a fiscal consolidation may alter qual-
itatively relative to normal times. Namely, a fiscal consolidation—a policy that is highly
probable to decelerate economic growth in normal times—may have a stimulative effect
1Aggregate private consumption is the biggest component of GDP—accounting for more than 60
percent of output in the total OECD economy for the period 1970 to 2011. Thus, unless fiscal policy has
a very strong adverse effect on gross private domestic investment and net exports, the size and direction
of the response of aggregate consumption to fiscal policy determines to a large extent the magnitude of
fiscal policy’s macroeconomic influence.
2See, e.g., Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Mountford and Uhlig, 2009; Hall, 2009; Ramey, 2011, among
others.
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on output and consumption when the public budget is in bad shape. Analogously, in
recessions the efficacy of fiscal policy may increase, or alter quantitatively, in contrast to
normal times: i.e., to the extent that recession is a period when many households are
liquidity constrained, a fiscal expansion may induce a crowding-out of private spending
to a lesser degree, if at all. The empirical specification in this paper is guided by the
theoretical frameworks in Perotti (1999) and Tagkalakis (2008). Both studies emphasize
how a portion of liquidity constrained households may alter the fiscal policy’s transmis-
sion mechanism. Second, throughout the Great Recession many OECD economies have
been facing the dilemma how to encourage economic growth without jeopardizing fiscal
stability. However, the theoretical and empirical guidance on how to steer the economy
in times of low economic activity and high risks of fiscal sustainability is at least scarce,
and on top of that harshly contended. The current empirical analysis is well suited to
address this question.
This paper is adjacent to two strands in the empirical literature. In the first strand, a
number of studies measure the conditional effects of fiscal policy on initial characteristics
(see, e.g. Perotti, 1999; Giavazzi, Jappelli, and Pagano, 2000; and, especially relevant
for the latest recession, Tagkalakis, 2008; Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh, 2011; Corsetti,
Meier, and Müller, 2012; and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012). In the second strand,
the papers deal with the question to what extent contractionary fiscal policy, and what
composition of the fiscal instruments, can encourage an expansion in private spending
and accelerate economic growth (e.g., Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990; Alesina and Perotti,
1995; Alesina and Ardagna, 2010).
The closest forerunners to my article are the papers by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012) and Corsetti, Meier, and Müller (2012). Both papers document that there is huge
variation on the evidence of fiscal multipliers across countries and time. Moreover, both
studies find that it may be necessary to control for more than one of the key factors which
affect the size of the multipliers. Otherwise, the estimates may still suffer the problem of
omitted variables bias. These predecessor studies also point out that fiscal policy may be
especially effective in financial crisis (or recessions). The difference between my paper and
the two mentioned studies, apart from my interest in consumption in particular, is the
focus on binding liquidity constraints for the qualitative and quantitative switch of the
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effects of fiscal policy when conditioning on the two initial factors—the business cycle and
fiscal stress. For that purpose I use an Euler equation approach, unlike the two papers
which rely on dynamic time-series specifications.
In order to anticipate the results, I give a flavor of my main findings. First, I find strong
support for the presence of liquidity constrained individuals in the OECD economies.
There is also strong evidence that fiscal stimulus, mainly through an expansion in govern-
ment spending, may have a big positive effect on consumption in recessions. The effect
can be negative, however, in times of fiscal stress coinciding with recession. There is mi-
nor evidence that tax increases can play stimulative role on consumption in a pure fiscal
stress regime.
The next section discusses the theoretical considerations, which motivate the empir-
ical investigation. Section 3 discusses the data and the econometric strategy. Section 4
presents the main empirical results and robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Considerations
In this section, as a guide to my empirical specification and a motivation for studying the
conditional effects of fiscal policy on the phase of the business cycle and the state of the
public finances simultaneously, I sketch briefly two theoretical models, described in detail
in Perotti (1999) and Tagkalakis (2008). With a few but important differences, the model
economies are almost identical.
There are several basic assumptions that taken together contribute for the asymmetric
conditional effects of fiscal policy dependent on the initial factors. However, the main
ingredient that insures the switch in the behaviour of the economy is the coexistence of
liquidity constrained and unconstrained consumers.
2.1 Business Cycle
The model economy in Tagkalakis (2008) expiriences periodic switches of high and low
economic activity, respectively expansions and recessions. The switch from low to high
activity, and vice versa, happens with probability one every period. The government in
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the economy levies taxes on a lump-sum basis.3 The economy is populated by heteroge-
neous agents. There are two types of forward-looking individuals: both of them know the
structure of the economy, both have the same time-invariant utility function, with the
difference that one of them, the liquidity-constrained ones, are unable to access financial
markets in periods of recession and cannot borrow. This means that in recessions, the
liquidity-constrained agents are unable to internalize the government budget constraint.
In expansions, liquidity constraints do not bind. In addition, an increase in government
consumption has a positive effect on economic output and consecutively on labor in-
come, due to price stickiness or other Keynesian features that are not modelled explicitly.
Finally, it is assumed that the positive effect on labor income following an increase in
government consumption dominates the negative effect of higher taxation, leading to an
overall positive change in disposable income given the shock.
Both type of agents smooth their consumption and react to innovations in the present
discounted value of their life-time income. Hence when switching from expansions to
recessions the change in consumption of both agents should be equal: they revise their
spending by reacting to the unexpected change in their income. On the contrary, the
change in consumption of the two agents is different when moving from recessions to
expansions. Following a fiscal shock, the liquidity-constrained agents react fully to it.
Thus, this simple model provides a testable hypothesis. In the presence of liquidity-
constrained individuals, both unanticipated and anticipated shocks can influence private
consumption in periods of recession.4 It can be also tested whether a fiscal expansion,
through increase in government consumption or a fall in taxes, generates a bigger positive
change in private consumption in recessions compared to expansions. The size of the
response hinges on the proportion of liquidity-constrained agents.
2.2 Fiscal Stress
The main difference between the model in Perotti (1999) and in Tagkalakis (2008), except
that the economy experiences no periodic switches between high and low economic activ-
3Note that even with distortionary taxation the prediction of the model about the higher efficacy of
fiscal policy in recessions will not change.
4Campbell and Mankiw (1989) were the first to relate the predictability of changes in consumption to
changes in income growth due to the presence of liquidity constrained agents.
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ity, is the higher discount rate at which the government discounts the future compared to
households in Perotti (1999). This implies that the direct costs to society from taxation
are higher, as tax-smoothing is initially not perfect. That is, the expected path of taxes
is per se increasing. A minor difference, from the above framework, is that the liquidity
constrained agents are excluded from the financial markets, no matter the state of the
economy. Thus, their consumption is fully determined by their disposable income. As
a result, these agents experience no wealth effects of fiscal policy. The unconstrained
agents, however, do react to the wealth effect of the anticipated changes in fiscal policy.
This model economy provides also testable predictions. A fiscal consolidation will have
a positive effect on private spending, by reducing future distortionary taxation, the higher
is the proportion of liquidity unconstrained agents. Such a prediction is also more likely
the worse is the public budget position—the cyclically adjusted deficit and debt/output
ratio are high. Fiscal consolidations in times of no fiscal stress are supposed to decelerate
output and consumption.
3 Data and empirical specification
I use the sketched models as a basis for my empirical specification. My empirical approach
proceeds in two steps. First, I specify and estimate government spending and tax rules
as well as the anticipated behaviour of household disposable income. In the second step,
I use the estimated unanticipated policy movements—the predicted errors from the fiscal
behaviour equations—and the anticipated effect on disposable income to estimate the
structural equation and see whether the generated regressors from the first step have
an impact on private consumption above and beyond what theory predicts and whether
the shocks’ importance differs depending on the state of the economy. This two-step
method was used first by Barro (1977) to test the conjecture that only the unanticipated
movements in money supply have an effect on the unemployment rate, in contrast to the
anticipated. Recently, Perotti (1999) and Tagkalakis (2008) apply the same methodology
for testing the effect of fiscal policy on consumption in different states of the economy.
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3.1 Data
This section describes the data and the approximation of the empirical counterparts to
the ’unobservables’—the phase of business cycle and the regimes of fiscal stress. The
sample covers a panel of sixteen OECD countries, ranging from 1974 to 2011. In Table 1,
I describe the data and their sources in detail. Most of the data is extracted from the
OECD tables. The advantage of using these time-series is the consistent treatment of
definitions of the series across countries. Except for the composite leading indicator
series, extracted from the Main Economic Indicators (MEI), all other OECD data is
published in the Economic Outlook (EO) No. 90. Public debt data and the narrative
information on fiscal consolidations is taken from April 2012 edition of the International
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) World Economic Outlook and from Devries, Guajardo, Leigh,
and Pescatori (2011), respectively. To have a better comparison between the results in
this paper to those in Perotti (1999), in terms of the length of the time-series, initially
I intended compiling an extension of his dataset. However, having at least twenty data
points per country is a prerequisite for including any country in the current analysis.
And respectively, the availability of the narrative series in Devries, Guajardo, Leigh, and
Pescatori (2011) as well as data limitations related to fiscal and household sector data
from the OECD tables constrain the choice of countries I can include in my sample.
The sixteen included countries are the following: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Prior to studying the conditional effects of fiscal policy in bad times, I have to define
them. The periods of bad times I have emphasized as important for the transmission
mechanism of fiscal policy are the recessionary phase of the business cycle and the regime
of fiscal stress, respectively. These two states have no distinctive manifestations that
we can observe and, accordingly, have to be approximated. In both cases, there is no
universally established definition of what represents recession or fiscal stress. To avoid
creating my own definitions, I rely on ones used previously in the literature. I also consider
two different specifications for the approximations of both recession and fiscal stress which
are meant to capture to a varying degree the prevalence/severity of the unobservable state.
These two specifications are denoted with a number in brackets, respectively (1) and (2),
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refering to criterion one or two.
In regard to the business cycles approximation, I consider definitions of recessions that
rely on the concept of output gap, i.e., recessions are periods when the actual output is
below the potential one, and pervasiveness of under-utilized resources plague the econ-
omy. Similar definitions of recessions have been used in Tagkalakis (2008), ? and Baum,
Poplawski-Ribeiro, and Weber (2012). For that purpose, for each individual country in
my dataset I use output gaps calculated by the OECD. The OECD variable GAP mea-
sures the difference between actual and potential GDP as a share of potential GDP, where
potential output is extrapolated using a production function method.5 Accordingly, based
on criterion (1), the dummy variable D(1)t that approximates the business cycle, assumes
a value 1 when the GAP variable is negative, and 0 otherwise. Based on criterion (2), the
dummy variable D(2)t, which supposedly captures only the more severe recession periods,
assumes a value 1 when the GAP is negative and when, in a sequence of periods with
negative output gaps, at least one of the following two conditions is fulfilled: first, the
output gap turns more negative between the first and the second period in the sequence,
and/or second, the difference between the last positive output gap prior to the sequence
and the first negative output gap is bigger than three percent.6 The dates that are filtered
as recessions according to criteria (1) and (2) are listed in Table 2.
Similar to my strategy for approximating the business cycles, to categorize the state of
fiscal stress I rely on definitions that are common in the literature. Both, Perotti (1999)
and Corsetti, Meier, and Müller (2012) focus on threshold values of the level of public debt
and net government lending as a share of GDP to separate bad from good fiscal regimes.
Likewise, according to criterion (1), the dummy variable F (1)t that proxies the fiscal state,
assumes a value 1 when the share of lagged public debt to GDP is bigger than seventy
percent and the the share of lagged government borrowing (the negative of net government
lending) to GDP is bigger than four percent, and 0 otherwise. Based on criterion (2),
5There are other approaches available for approximating the output gap. Koske and Pain (2008.
pp. 6–8) provide an overview of the usefulness of alternative output gap estimates, compared for example
with output gaps extracted using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, in terms of their predictive power of
inflation and cyclically-adjusted public budget balance. They find that the production-function estimates
contain information for predicting inflation and the fiscal position that are comparable to the alternative
measures, even slightly superior.
6The second rule aims to capture contractionary periods which feature a very steep fall of actual output
below potential but which also can experience a quick, however feeble, rebound of output afterwards.
Many OECD countries have experienced similar behaviour of output during the Great Recession.
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the dummy variable F (2)t, which is progressively a more stringent manifestation of fiscal
turmoil, assumes a value 1 when the share of lagged public debt to GDP is bigger than
eighty percent and the share of lagged government borrowing to GDP is bigger than
five percent, and 0 otherwise. The periods that are filtered as bad states of fiscal stress
according to criteria (1) and (2) are listed in Table 3.
3.2 Consumption Euler equation
I study the behaviour of private consumption following unanticipated actions in fiscal pol-
icy. The liquidity unconstrained agents smooth their consumption intertemporally and
incorporate the unanticipated changes in government spending, εgt , and taxation, εtat , in
their decision rules. The liquidity constrained agents, however, react to both unantici-
pated and anticipated changes in their disposable income, ∆It/t−1. Here ∆It/t−1 denotes
the anticipated change in disposable income between t and t − 1. The construction of
the anticipated and the unanticipated variables is discussed in this section below and in
Section 3.3. According to the models in Perotti (1999) and Tagkalakis (2008), the unan-
ticipated fiscal actions will have a distinctive impact on consumption conditional on the
two bad states: fiscal stress and recession. By the logic of the two models, counteracting
forces should define the size and sign of the effect of fiscal policy in the mixed state: that
is, due to fiscal stress the wealth effect is enlarged when the fiscal budget position is bad,
however, due to rise in the proportion of liquidity constrained agents in recessions the
wealth effect should be weakened. To make explicit the distinctive effect of fiscal policy
in the four possible states I interact the recession dummy, Dt, the fiscal stress dummy,
Ft, and the mixed state—the interaction of the two dummies—DtFt, with the exogenous
fiscal changes.
As a result, the empirical specification takes the form:
∆Ct = γ
n
1 ε̂
g
t + γ
n
2 ε̂
ta
t + γ
d
1Dtε̂
g
t + γ
d
2Dtε̂
ta
t + γ
f
1Ftε̂
g
t + γ
f
2Ftε̂
ta
t + γ
df
1 DtFtε̂
g
t + γ
df
2 DtFtε̂
ta
t
+ µ∆Ît/t−1 + ωct , (1)
where a hat, •̂, over a variable denotes a generated regressor. Respectively, γn1 and
γn2 measure the effects of the two fiscal shocks on consumption in normal states. The
dummies Dt and Ft are set equal to 1 in recessions or fiscal stress, and 0 in normal times.
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In Eq. (1) it is possible to test formally the variability of the shocks’ coefficients in the
different states. The coefficients γd1 and γd2 measure the difference in the impact of the
fiscal shocks during recessions compared to normal times. Respectively, the coefficients
γf1 and γ
f
2 measure the change in impact of the fiscal shocks during fiscal stress relative
to normal states. Finally, the coefficients γdf1 and γ
df
2 measure the change in impact of
the fiscal shocks during mixed states, again relative to normal. Excluding the six new
variables—the interaction of the dummies with the generated regressors—corresponds to
the formulation made by many in the literature. That is, fiscal policy has an equal effect
on private consumption regardless of initial conditions. ωct is a stochastic unpredictable
component of consumption that is uncorrelated with the regressors by assumption. The
coefficient of the income regressor, µ, measures the significance of "anticipated" changes
in disposable income on aggregate consumption.7 I estimate Eq. (1) by the Prais-Winsten
method, a linear estimation with a correction for first-order serial correlation in the error
term. Full set of country and year dummies variables are included in the estimation.
The generated regressors εgt and εtat in equation (1) need not be correlated with the
error term ωct for the estimation of the coefficients to be consistent. This assumption
may be violated because policy-makers may react to contemporaneous developments in
the economy due to automatic rules in the functioning of fiscal policy and because of
discretionary actions of the government within an year. To that matter, I have cyclically
adjusted the unanticipated fiscal shocks and from now on these have to be interpreted
as shocks corrected from cyclical movements. The assumption that the government stays
inactive following changes in the economy is more contentious. Concerning the adjustment
of government spending within the year, Beetsma, Giuliodori, and Klaassen (2009) and
Born and Müller (2009) provide evidence that the assumption is valid both in quarterly
and in annual time series for a number of OECD countries.8 In regard to the assumption
about no discretionary changes in taxation within an year, Perotti (1999) argues that
7Disposable income can have an impact on consumption for unrelated reasons to liquidity constraints,
e.g. income uncertainty, habit formation, non-separability between consumption and leisure. Also, over-
lapping generation models predict a rise in consumption with a rise in income. Therefore, as pointed out
in Campbell and Mankiw (1989), the coefficient of the disposable income is a reduced form parameter,
providing evidence in favour of binding liquidity constraints, among other things.
8Other authors are less convinced in the validity of this assumption. Results by Lane (2003) provide
evidence that government wage consumption can be procyclical in a number of OECD countries. Evidence
by Lamo, Pérez, and Schuknecht (2008) corroborates this by showing that government wages have a
reasonably procyclical price component.
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there is no reason to expect that the difference in the impact of taxation between the four
distinctice states (the two in his paper) within an year, the main interest in this article,
should be biased systematically in any direction.
Before proceeding further, I need to make one additional remark. Perotti (1999)
observes that in a typical Euler equation, the scaling factor does not change results con-
siderably: i.e., the ratio of consumption over disposable income is pretty stable over time.9
The tested Euler equation, however, includes fiscal shocks that change invariably in size
with the change of the size of government over time. Respectively, one can expect that
changes in government consumption can produce different effects on private consumption
depending on whether government consumption accounts for 10% or 30% of the total ex-
penditures in the economy. Hence, following the standard log difference approach, taken
by many in the literature, can lead to misleading conclusions. The proper scaling factor
in the case is the lagged value of disposable income. Except otherwise stated, all variables
are nominal series divided by the population size. To express the variables in real terms
I divide the fiscal variables and the gross domestic product total (GDP), Yt, used in the
estimations latter, by the GDP deflator. For the private household variables I use the
private consumption expenditure (PCE) deflator. All period-by-period changes are nor-
malized by the lagged value of household disposable income expressed in real per capita
terms.
I estimate the anticipated changes in disposable income conditional on lagged informa-
tion only. Moreover, I control for the effect of fiscal policy changes on disposable income
by explicitly including the fiscal variables in the prediction equation. Therefore, by con-
struction ∆Ît/t−1 is orthogonal to the error term in Eq. (1), ωct . I impute the anticipated
regressor in Eq. (1), ∆Ît/t−1, by the fitted values from the following specification:
∆It = β0 + β1∆It−1 + β2∆It−2 + β3∆It−3 + β4∆Tt−1 + β5∆Tt−2 + β6∆Gt−1 + β7∆Gt−2
+ β8∆Ct−2 + β9country∆Ct−2 + εit, (2)
where I regress the change in household disposable income on its own lags, the lagged
changes in tax labor revenues, ∆Tt, the lagged changes in government consumption, ∆Gt,
and the lagged changes in consumption as well as the lagged changes in consumption
9In the short run, however, consumption may at times seem detached from disposable income, e.g.
during the financial liberalization many households have spent consistently above their earnings.
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interacted with the country specific dummy, country. Lagged consumption is included to
capture the idea that income dynamics is anticipated by consumption (specifically labor
income). The changes in lagged disposable income control for the state of the business
cycle, while by including lagged fiscal variables I control for their anticipated effects of
fiscal policy on disposable income.
3.3 Fiscal prediction equations
In the first step of the estimation procedure, I calculate the fiscal policy shocks in annual
time series. The conjecture is that changes in government consumption, ∆Gt, and labour
income taxation, ∆Tt, follow simple rules where the fiscal variable of interest, depends on
its own lags, the lagged changes in output, ∆Yt, and the lagged between-periods difference
in the imputed interest rate on public debt, ∆Rt. In addition, ∆Gt depends on the lagged
changes in total government tax revenue, Qt, while ∆Tt depends on the lagged changes in
∆Gt. Labour income taxation, Tt, is computed as the sum of the personal income taxes
and employees contributions to the government social insurance. Respectively, total tax
revenue, Qt, is the sum of total direct and indirect taxes, plus private social security
contributions to the government. Each equation includes also a constant.
∆Gt = α1,0 + α1,2∆Gt−1 + α1,3∆Qt−1 + α1,4∆Yt−1 + α1,5∆Yt−2 + α1,6∆Rt−1 + ε
g
t ,
∆Tt = α2,0 + α2,2∆Gt−1 + α2,3∆Tt−1 + α2,4∆Yt−1 + α2,5∆Yt−2 + α2,6∆Rt−1 + εtt, (3)
∆Yt = α3,0 + α3,2∆Gt−1 + α3,3∆Qt−1 + α3,4∆Yt−1 + α3,5∆Yt−2 + α3,6∆Rt−1 + ε
y
t .
I adjust the labor income tax shocks by using the methodology proposed by Blanchard
(1990) and Perotti (1999). The adjustment is motivated by the necessity to remove fluc-
tuations induced by cyclical movements of the tax base. The adjusted shock is computed
by the formula ε̂tat = ε̂tt − φtε̂ytT rt .10 The elasticity φt is calculated by weighting the
GDP-elasticity of each of the taxes included in T rt by the relative size of the same tax
compared to the total tax revenue. The GDP-elasticities of taxes are provided by Giorno,
Richardson, Roseveare, and van den Noord (1995), van den Noord (2000), and Girouard
10T rt is the ratio of government’s labor income tax receipts to the previous year disposable income,
where both series are expressed in real per capita terms.
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and André (2005).11 Government consumption shocks are not cyclically adjusted. A
standard assumption in the VAR literature states that government consumption does not
automatically respond to output, within a quarter or year.12,13
4 Results
Setting the stage
Table 4 summarizes the estimation results for six alternative econometric specifications
nested in equation (1) using one of the four possible combinations between two different
sets of dummies: these are respectively dummies D(1) and F (2). I present the table in or-
der to highlight how different the conditional effect can be compared to the unconditional.
For example, starting with column (1), the effect of government spending on consumption
is positive but insignificant from zero. The effect of tax shocks is negative and significant
at the one percent level. These results are in line with the cited pre-crisis literature. This
finding can be seen in Perotti (2005) and Tagkalakis (2008), (table 10), among others.
In the post-1980 period, like the data span in this paper, the effects of fiscal policy on
consumption are small, even zero. Generally, small or negative fiscal multipliers have been
attributed to the relaxation of credit constraints with the financial liberalization in this
period.
In column (2), however, once I control for the presence of recession regimes the results
change. The effect of government spending becomes negative and significant at 10 %
level in normal times. In contrast, the conditional effect flips sign in recessions. The
estimated value of γd1 is 0.92 and significant at 5 % level. Thus, in recession the effects of
government spending on private consumption is overall positive and equal to 0.49, with
a p-value of a test of the difference in coefficients between good and bad times equal to
11The OECD has computed the semi-elasticities of taxes on a regular basis for a number of OECD
countries, about once per four years each time.
12The usual identification in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) is the assumption that there is no fiscal
policy systematic discretionary response in quarterly data. Arguably, we can categorize changes in fiscal
variables due to automatic, systematic discretionary and random discretionary reasons. We are interested
in the random discretionary component. If there is no systematic discretionary factor, what is left are
the automatic and random factors. With readily (externally available) elasticity of taxes to GDP, I can
then construct random unanticipated fiscal changes, adjusted for cyclical components.
13A drawback of choosing higher frequency data is that it is available and reliable only for the post
war period. Also non-interpolated series for government tax revenues are existant only for a number of
countries.
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zero (reported in the table below). Observe that the tax innovation has a negative and
significant effect in normal times and more negative effect in bad times. The difference
between the impact in good and bad times is not statistically significant. This is also
reflected in the p-value of the test. Observe that in column (3) the difference in effect
of the spending shock between pure recession and normal times becomes even bigger.
This supports the hypothesis in my paper. That is, once I differenciate between pure
recessions and states in which recessions accompany fiscal stress, the effects of fiscal policy
on consumption in the two distinctive states become statistically different from each other:
in the mixed regime the effect of government spending becomes negative and significant
at 5 % level. Recall that the wealth effect on unconstrained individuals is increased in
periods of fiscal vulnerability: The overall effect of public spending on consumption is
-1.39 in the mixed state. Symmetrically, the effect of taxation becomes positive, but not
statistically significant.
In columns (4) and (5) I condition on the presence of fiscal stress. The coefficients
measuring the effects of fiscal policy in fiscal stress, γf1 and γ
f
2 , are consistent with the
prediction in Perotti (1999), however, they are not statistically significant. Similar to
this finding, using a dataset with both industrialized and developing countries, Schclarek
(2007) cannot find statistically significant support for the hypothesis that fiscal contrac-
tions can play stimulative role on private spending with an identical to Perotti’s setup.
Finally, specification (6) is a full scale version of the empirical specification. The results
for this particular specification are also depicted in table 5.
Baseline results
Table 5 summarizes the results for the four combinations of the two sets of bad regime
dummies. First, concerning the anticipated effect, my results are broadly consistent with
the evidence presented in Campbell and Mankiw (1989), i.e., rule-of-thumb consumers (for
whom, by assumption, consumption equals current income) are on average estimated to
earn about µ=0.4-5 of aggregate income. Second, the efficacy of fiscal policy increases in
recessions, as observed in Corsetti, Meier, and Müller (2012) and Auerbach and Gorod-
nichenko (2012). In all four combinations with the alternative dummies, the effect of
government in recession is statistically different from the effect in normal times, and pos-
itive. Symmetrically, taxation decreases consumption by more in recessions. Third, fiscal
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policy contractions do not stimulate consumption in any of the four combinations. The
overall effect of fiscal changes in purely fiscal stress states is zero.
Fourth, an interesting result of the current analysis is the estimate for the impact
of government spending on consumption in mixed states. The effect is negative and
statistically significant. The size of the overall effect varies between -2.0 and -2.5. In terms
of the frameworks in Perotti (1999) and Tagkalakis (2008), the result is even puzzling. If
the wealth effect is supposed to be very big or very small dependent on either fiscal stress
or recession state, the effect should be in between when the two states coincide. This is
not the case. The effect is even more negative compared to the impact of government
spending on consumption conditional on purely fiscal stress state. A possible explanation
for this empirical finding is the framework in Corsetti, Kuester, Meier, and Müller (2012).
The authors emphasize how sovereign-risk premium can affect the borrowing conditions
in the broader economy. In normal times, the correlation between public and private
borrowing costs seem to be detached from each other. In crises situations, however, these
become strongly correlated. Therefore, there is a spill-over in tightening of borrowing
cosntraints from the private to the public sector, and vice versa. The effects of the two
constraints may even reinforce each other.
Finally, note that at the bottom of the table I report the p-values of the F statistics
of whether the spending shocks, or respectively the tax shocks, are statistically different
from one another in the different regimes. For the full scale model, we observe that the
tests provide statistical support that the government spending shocks have a different
effect on consumption in all four possible states. The variability of the effects of taxation
on consumption is weaker conditional on the four different states.
Predictability
A key assumption in the estimation of equation (1) is that unanticipated components
to government spending and taxation are not predictable. In the near-VARs with which I
generate the fiscal shocks, I try to ensure unpredictability by including sufficiently many
endogenous variables as well as their lags so that the error component is orthogonal to
past information. However, Ramey (2012) observes that many changes in fiscal variables
are anticipated. To check whether the results so far pass the test of predictability I specify
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a new near-VAR system:
∆Gt = α1,0 + α1,2∆Gt−1 + α1,3∆Qt−1 + α1,4∆Yt−1 + α1,5∆Yt−2 + α1,6∆Rt−1
+ α1,7Dt + α1,8Ft + α1,9DtFt + α1,10∆Pt−1 + ε
g
t ,
∆Tt = α2,0 + α2,2∆Gt−1 + α2,3∆Tt−1 + α2,4∆Yt−1 + α2,5∆Yt−2 + α2,6∆Rt−1 (4)
+ α2,7Dt + α2,8Ft + α2,9DtFt + α2,10∆Pt−1 + εtt,
∆Yt = α3,0 + α3,2∆Gt−1 + α3,3∆Qt−1 + α3,4∆Yt−1 + α3,5∆Yt−2 + α3,6∆Rt−1
+ α3,7Dt + α3,8Ft + α3,9DtFt + α3,10∆Pt−1 + ε
y
t .
Here, I posit that the processes of government spending and taxation is augmented by
a new lagged variable, ∆Pt−1, a composite leading indicator (CLI) that proxies the fore-
casters’ expectations with respect to next-year growth, as well as the two regime dummies
and their interaction. The CLI variable has been used also by Corsetti, Meier, and Müller
(2012) on basis of its proven ability to predict cyclical turning points in advance. The
new estimation of the fiscal shocks supposedly filters away past regularities that are not
successfully purged by equation (3). The results from estimating equation (1) with the
newly estimated fiscal shocks are displayed in Table 6. If anything, the benchmark results
are reinforced.
Measurement error
The fiscal shocks in equation (3) and (4) are supposed to capture only randomly discre-
tionary changes of the government actions, and purge away any systematic discretionary
or cyclical adjustments of the fiscal variables. As already discussed, despite taking care of
cyclically adjusting the government spending and tax shock, these may still be correlated
with the error term in equation (1). Instrumental variable estimation is a natural solution
to the problem. Devries, Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2011) estimate "action-based"
or "narrative" measures of fiscal consolidations, in the spirit of Romer and Romer (2010).
Respectively, the narrative series on exogenous, purely action-based fiscal changes provide
for natural instruments for the fiscal shocks generated in the estimation of equation (3).
The narrative series in this study, however, differ by those collected by Romer and Romer
(2010) in one important aspect relevant for my analysis. Romer and Romer (2010) identify
exogenous tax changes prompted by two main motives—the incentive to improve long-run
growth and to reduce persistent budget deficits. Alternatively, Devries, Guajardo, Leigh,
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and Pescatori (2011) identify exogenous fiscal actions based only on the second motive.
This consideration points to the possibility that the correlation between the narrative
series and the generated regressors is reduced.
Similar to Ramey (2012) who uses the series in Romer and Romer (2010) to identify
how strongly tax changes affect total private spending, I make the assumption that the
motives to reduce persistent public budgets influence private consumption by the unantic-
ipated changes in government spending and taxation, and by the anticipated changes in
disposable income. In the estimation, I experimented with various lags of the two narra-
tive instruments. Finally, I use three lags of the narrative series given that this number of
lags produces the highest Anderson-Rubin Wald statistic, measuring the statistical signif-
icance of the endogenous regressors in the structural equation, and the Kleibergen-Paap
statistic, testing for weak instruments. The results for the intrumental variable estimation
are displayed in Table 7. The results differ slightly from baseline results. Namely, the
effect of government spending on consumption in mixed states is only marginally signifi-
cant now. Given the truncation problem with the exogenous narrative series, however, the
lack of the statistical significance of the coefficient in mixed states does not overturn the
main results in the paper. On the opposite, taking into consideration the overall effect of
spending on consumption in the mixed state,-3.0 to -5.0, the results are even reinforced.
5 Conclusion
Throughout the Great Recession, many OECD countries reached to fiscal policy to offset
the large negative shocks, initially triggered by sharp declines in house and stock prices
and later by a tightening of credit and financing conditions. These discretionary fiscal
changes, however, have not been greeted with equal sympathy.
In this paper, I have addressed the role of liquidity constraints for the varying degree
of efficacy of fiscal policy. The results in the paper support predictions of Keynesian
models, in the spirit of Keynes (1936), that fiscal policy, through an expansion in govern-
ment spending, may be potent in boosting aggregate demand when the economy suffers
from under-utilized resources. However, this action may be counter-productive when the
government budget is itself under stress, and the economy is in a recession.
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Table 1: Data Information
Variable Definition Source
POP Population level OECD FS: population level, POP;
Y DEF GDP deflator OECD EO: deflator of gross domestic product, PGDP;
CDEF Consumption deflator OECD EO: deflator of private final consumption
expenditure, PCP;
INFL Rate of inflation, log difference of Y DEF OECD EO: deflator of gross domestic product, PGDP;
GDP Nominal GDP OECD EO: nominal gross domestic product, GDP;
DEFC Negative of government net lending OECD EO: government net lending, NLG;
DEBT Gross government debt Main source IMF WEO: General government gross debt,
GGXWDG; missing data filled-in if available by OECD
EO’s general government gross financial liabilities, GGFL;
∆I Percentage change in disposable income, in
decimals
OECD EO: Gross or net household disposable income,
YDH_G or YDH; Population level, POP; Consumption
Deflator, PCP;
∆Y Change in GDP as a share of lagged I OECD EO: Gross domestic product, value, GDP;
Population level, POP; Consumption Deflator, PGDP;
∆C Change in consumption as a share of lagged
I
OECD EO: Private final consumption expenditure, CP;
Population level, POP; Consumption Deflator, PCP;
∆G Change in government consumption
expenditures as a share of lagged I
OECD EO: Government final consumption expenditure,
CG; Population level, POP; GDP Deflator, PGDP;
∆Gi Change in government fixed capital
formation as a share of lagged I
OECD EO: Gross government fixed capital formation, IG;
Population level, POP; GDP Deflator, PGDP;
∆Gc Change in government consumption and
fixed capital formation as a share of lagged I
Government consumption and fixed capital formation is the
sum of CG and IG; Population level, POP; GDP Deflator,
PGDP;
∆T Change in labor income taxes on household
as a share of lagged I
OECD EO: Sum of direct taxes on households, TYH, and
social security contributions by households, TRSSH;
Population level, POP; GDP Deflator, PGDP;
∆Q Change in total tax revenue as a share of
lagged I
OECD EO: Sum of total direct taxes, TY, social security
contribution received by general government, SSRG, and
taxes on production and imports, TIND; Population level,
POP; GDP Deflator, PGDP;
∆R Change in interest rate, in decimals;
Interest rate is ratio of government net
interest payments to gross government debt
minus INFL
DEBT and INFL are defined above; OECD EO: Net
government interest payments, GNINTP;
∆P Log difference of composite leading indicator OECD MEI: amplitude adjusted composite leading
indicator, CLI;
GAP Output gap OECD EO: Output gap of the total economy, GAP;
Notes: Unless otherwise stated, all nominal series expressed in real per capita terms. To comply to the critique of Whelan
(2002), who discusses reasons why manipulating chain-weighted data in a linear way is incorrect, I add/substract nominal
series and only in the final step I deflate them by the respective deflator. OECD EO is an abbreviation for OECD
Economic Outlook, Statistics and Projections database. OECD FS is an abbreviation for OECD Factbook Statistics
database. OECD MEI is an abbreviation for OECD Main Economic Indicators database. IMF WEO is an an abbreviation
for IMF World Economic Outlook database. To avoid the structural break at German unification in 1991, I chain the West
German and the unified German time series by using overlapping 1991 data.
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Table 2: Recession Dummy Information
Dummy Definition Country Time Period
D(1)t Assumes value of 1 Australia 1991-97, 2001, 2009-11
if GAPt < 0, Austria 1976, 1978, 1981-88, 1993-97, 2002-05, 2009-11
0 otherwise Belgium 1975, 1977-79, 1981-87, 1993-98, 2002-05, 2009-11
Canada 1975, 1982-84, 1991-98, 2008-11
Denmark 1981-83, 1988-95, 2002-04, 2009-11
Finland 1977-78, 1981-85, 1991-97, 2002-05, 2009-11
France 1981-87, 1993-97, 2002-05, 2008-11
Germany 1975, 1981-87, 1993-99, 2002-05, 2009-2011
Italy 1982-87, 1992-99, 2003, 2009-11
Japan 1975-78, 1980, 1982-87, 1993-95, 1998-2005, 2009-11
Netherlands 1975, 1981-88, 1992-96, 2002-05, 2009-11
Portugal 1995-96, 2003-06, 2009-11
Spain 1979-87, 1993-98, 2009-11
Sweden 1977-78, 1981-83, 1991-98, 2001-03, 2009-11
U Kingdom 1975-76, 1980-85, 1991-97, 2009-11
U States 1975-77, 1980-84, 1991-96, 2002-03, 2009-11
D(2)t Assumes value of 1 Australia 1991-97, 2009-11
if GAPt < 0, Austria 1981-88, 1993-97, 2002-05, 2009-11
and Belgium 1981-87, 2002-05, 2009-11
either, in a sequence Canada 1982-84, 1991-98, 2008-11
of negative GAPs, Denmark 1981-83, 1988-95, 2002-04, 2009-11
GAP1 −GAP2 > 0, Finland 1977-78, 1981-85, 1991-97, 2002-05, 2009-11
and/or, in a sequence France 1981-87, 2002-05, 2008-11
of negative GAPs, Germany 1981-87, 2002-05, 2009-2011
GAP0−GAP1 > 0.03, Italy 1982-87, 1992-99, 2009-11
0 otherwise Japan 1975-78, 1982-87, 1993-95, 1998-2005, 2009-11
Netherlands 1981-88, 1992-96, 2002-05, 2009-11
Portugal 1995-96
Spain 1979-87, 2009-11
Sweden 1981-83, 1991-98, 2001-03, 2009-11
U Kingdom 1980-85, 1991-97, 2009-11
U States 1975-77, 1980-84, 2009-11
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Table 3: Fiscal Stress Dummy Information
Dummy Definition Country Time Period
F (1)t Assumes value of 1 Austria 2011
if Belgium 1981-97, 2010-11
DEFCt−1/GDPt−1 Canada 1987-96, 2010-11
is bigger than 0.04, Denmark 1983-85,
and, France 2010-11
DEBTt−1/GDPt−1 Germany 2011
is bigger than 0.7, Italy 1976-97, 2006, 2010-11
0 otherwise Japan 1996-2006, 2010-11
Netherlands 1985, 1987-1991, 1993, 1996
Portugal 2010-11
Sweden 1995-96
U Kingdom 2011
U States 1993-94, 2009-11
F (2)t Assumes value of 1 Belgium 1982-95, 2010
if Canada 1992-96, 2011
DEFCt−1/GDPt−1 Denmark 1984
is bigger than 0.05, France 2011
and, Italy 1979-80, 1982-83, 1986-97, 2010
DEBTt−1/GDPt−1 Japan 1997, 1999-2006, 2010-11
is bigger than 0.8, Portugal 2010-11
0 otherwise U States 2010-11
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Table 4: Setting the stage
∆Ct = γ
n
1 ε̂
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t + γ
n
2 ε̂
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t + γ
d
1Dtε̂
g
t + γ
d
2Dtε̂
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t + γ
f
1Ftε̂
g
t + γ
f
2Ftε̂
ta
t + γ
df
1 DtFtε̂
g
t + γ
df
2 DtFtε̂
ta
t + µ∆Ît/t−1 + ω
c
t
Baseline Estimates
Coefficient (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
γn1 0.05 −0.43∗ −0.44∗ 0.08 0.08 −0.48∗
(0.14) (0.18) (0.18) (0.15) (0.15) (0.19)
γn2 −0.25∗∗∗ −0.19∗ −0.19∗ −0.26∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ −0.21∗
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
γd1 0.92
∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.30) (0.31)
γd2 −0.12 −0.15 −0.13
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
γf1 −0.21 −0.21 0.40
(0.29) (0.51) (0.57)
γf2 0.12 0.30 0.24
(0.08) (0.20) (0.20)
γdf1 −0.95∗∗ −0.18 −1.34∗
(0.32) (0.57) (0.68)
γdf2 0.11 −0.26 −0.14
(0.09) (0.19) (0.21)
µ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
R¯2 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.69
P-value, ε̂gt ’s γs equal – 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.40 0.00
P-value, ε̂tat ’s γs equal – 0.23 0.24 0.15 0.31 0.25
Number of Dt – 239 239 – 239 239
Number of Ft – – 41 41 41 41
Number of DtFt – – 30 – 30 30
Number of Obs. 455 455 455 455 455 455
Notes: Regressions are estimated by the Prais-Winsten method correcting for country-specific heteroskedastic AR(1) residual
structure. Columns (1) to (6) report estimation results for all six alternative econometric specifications nested in the equation
(1). Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. {∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗} denote statistical significance at respectively {10, 5, 1}
percent. R¯2: Adjusted R2 of the first-stage regression. P-value, ε̂gt ’s γs equal: p-values of the Wald statistic testing whether
γs of ε̂gt differ across regimes. P-value, ε̂
ta
t ’s γs equal: p-values of the Wald statistic testing whether γs of ε̂
ta
t differ across
regimes. Number of Dt: Number of recession periods in sample. Number of Ft: Number of fiscal stress periods in sample.
Number of DtFt: Number of recessions coinciding with fiscal stress periods in sample. Number of Obs.: Number of total
periods in sample.
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Table 5: Baseline: all dummy combinations
∆Ct = γ
n
1 ε̂
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t + γ
n
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t + γ
d
1Dtε̂
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t + γ
d
2Dtε̂
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t + γ
f
1Ftε̂
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f
2Ftε̂
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df
1 DtFtε̂
g
t + γ
df
2 DtFtε̂
ta
t + µ∆Ît/t−1 + ω
c
t
Baseline Estimates
Coefficient (1) (2) (3) (4)
γn1 −0.47∗ −0.39∗ −0.48∗ −0.40∗
(0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18)
γn2 −0.23∗ −0.24∗ −0.21∗ −0.22∗
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
γd1 1.14
∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗
(0.34) (0.35) (0.31) (0.31)
γd2 −0.09 −0.07 −0.13 −0.11
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
γf1 0.08 0.14 0.40 0.48
(0.50) (0.43) (0.57) (0.38)
γf2 0.30 0.21 0.24 0.14
(0.16) (0.14) (0.20) (0.12)
γdf1 −0.78 −0.79 −1.34∗ −1.39∗∗
(0.66) (0.60) (0.68) (0.52)
γdf2 −0.20 −0.12 −0.14 −0.03
(0.17) (0.15) (0.21) (0.13)
µ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
R¯2 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69
P-value, ε̂gt ’s γs equal 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01
P-value, ε̂tat ’s γs equal 0.16 0.24 0.25 0.23
Number of Dt 239 196 239 196
Number of Ft 68 68 41 41
Number of DtFt 47 40 30 27
Number of Obs. 455 455 455 455
Notes: Regressions are estimated by the Prais-Winsten method correcting for country-specific heteroskedastic AR(1) residual
structure. Columns (1) to (4) report estimation results using all combinations of the alternative two sets of dummies in
the equation (1); respectively, (1): D(1) and F(1), (2): D(2) and F(1), (3): D(1) and F(2), (4): D(2) and F(2). Robust
standard errors are given in parentheses. {∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗} denote statistical significance at respectively {10, 5, 1} percent. R¯2:
Adjusted R2 of the first-stage regression. P-value, ε̂gt ’s γs equal: p-values of the Wald statistic testing whether γs of ε̂
g
t
differ across regimes. P-value, ε̂tat ’s γs equal: p-values of the Wald statistic testing whether γs of ε̂
ta
t differ across regimes.
Number of Dt: Number of recession periods in sample. Number of Ft: Number of fiscal stress periods in sample. Number
of DtFt: Number of recessions coinciding with fiscal stress periods in sample. Number of Obs.: Number of total periods in
sample.
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Table 6: Robustness analysis: predictability
∆Ct = γ
n
1 ε̂
g
t + γ
n
2 ε̂
ta
t + γ
d
1Dtε̂
g
t + γ
d
2Dtε̂
ta
t + γ
f
1Ftε̂
g
t + γ
f
2Ftε̂
ta
t + γ
df
1 DtFtε̂
g
t + γ
df
2 DtFtε̂
ta
t + µ∆Ît/t−1 + ω
c
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Control for Predictability
Coefficient (1) (2) (3) (4)
γn1 −0.29 −0.22 −0.40∗ −0.32
(0.20) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18)
γn2 −0.16 −0.18 −0.19 −0.21
(0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
γd1 0.93
∗∗ 0.75∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗
(0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (0.32)
γd2 −0.21 −0.17 −0.19 −0.16
(0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
γf1 0.70 0.48 0.92 0.70
(0.42) (0.40) (0.64) (0.47)
γf2 0.11 0.15 0.05 0.11
(0.17) (0.13) (0.20) (0.12)
γdf1 −1.50∗∗ −1.18∗ −2.15∗∗ −1.95∗∗
(0.57) (0.58) (0.80) (0.70)
γdf2 −0.04 −0.08 0.02 0.02
(0.19) (0.17) (0.23) (0.18)
µ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
R¯2 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.70
P-value, ε̂gt ’s γs equal 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.01
P-value, ε̂tat ’s γs equal 0.10 0.03 0.39 0.12
Number of Dt 234 191 234 191
Number of Ft 68 68 41 41
Number of DtFt 47 40 30 27
Number of Obs. 447 447 447 447
Notes: Regressions are estimated by the Prais-Winsten method correcting for country-specific heteroskedastic AR(1) residual
structure. Columns (1) to (4) report estimation results using all combinations of the alternative two sets of dummies in
the equation (1); respectively, (1): D(1) and F(1), (2): D(2) and F(1), (3): D(1) and F(2), (4): D(2) and F(2). Robust
standard errors are given in parentheses. {∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗} denote statistical significance at respectively {10, 5, 1} percent. R¯2:
Adjusted R2 of the first-stage regression. P-value, ε̂gt ’s γs equal: p-values of the Wald statistic testing whether γs of ε̂
g
t
differ across regimes. P-value, ε̂tat ’s γs equal: p-values of the Wald statistic testing whether γs of ε̂
ta
t differ across regimes.
Number of Dt: Number of recession periods in sample. Number of Ft: Number of fiscal stress periods in sample. Number
of DtFt: Number of recessions coinciding with fiscal stress periods in sample. Number of Obs.: Number of total periods in
sample.
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Table 7: Robustness analysis: measurement error
∆Ct = γ
n
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IV Estimates
Coefficient (1) (2) (3) (4)
γn1 −2.07 −1.93∗ −1.58∗ −0.96
(1.07) (0.94) (0.74) (0.75)
γn2 −0.61 −0.32 −0.58∗ −0.35
(0.39) (0.30) (0.27) (0.26)
γd1 4.24
∗∗∗ 3.93∗∗∗ 2.83∗∗∗ 2.20∗∗
(1.09) (1.03) (0.74) (0.75)
γd2 0.30 0.10 0.10 −0.08
(0.45) (0.34) (0.35) (0.30)
γf1 0.87 1.01 1.44 0.90
(1.50) (1.48) (1.48) (1.45)
γf2 0.51 0.21 0.39 0.33
(0.46) (0.35) (0.46) (0.40)
γdf1 −2.78 −2.68 −2.70 −2.32
(1.57) (1.55) (1.66) (1.55)
γdf2 −0.42 −0.38 −0.15 0.18
(0.55) (0.17) (0.47) (0.39)
µ 0.37∗ 0.33∗ 0.44∗∗ 0.39∗∗
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13)
P-value, K-P Wald 0.76 0.72 0.38 0.54
P-value, A-R Wald 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P-value, ε̂gt ’s γs equal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P-value, ε̂tat ’s γs equal 0.71 0.82 0.48 0.80
Number of Dt 235 195 235 195
Number of Ft 68 68 41 41
Number of DtFt 47 40 30 27
Number of Obs. 437 437 437 437
Notes: Regressions are estimated in the context of Generalized Method of Moments correcting for country-specific het-
eroskedastic AR(1) residual structure. Columns (1) to (4) report estimation results using all combinations of the alternative
two sets of dummies in the equation (1); respectively, (1): D(1) and F(1), (2): D(2) and F(1), (3): D(1) and F(2), (4):
D(2) and F(2). Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. {∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗} denote statistical significance at respec-
tively {10, 5, 1} percent. P-value, K-P Wald: p-values of the Kleibergen-Paap underidentification Wald statistic testing
the "relevance" of the excluded instruments. P-value, A-R Wald: p-values of the Anderson-Rubin Wald statistic testing
the significance of the endogenous regressors in the structural equation, i.e. weak instruments test. P-value, ε̂gt ’s γs equal:
p-values of the Wald statistic testing whether γs of ε̂gt differ across regimes. P-value, ε̂
ta
t ’s γs equal: p-values of the Wald
statistic testing whether γs of ε̂tat differ across regimes. Number of Dt: Number of recession periods in sample. Number of
Ft: Number of fiscal stress periods in sample. Number of DtFt: Number of recessions coinciding with fiscal stress periods
in sample. Number of Obs.: Number of total periods in sample.
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